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The legal definition of a not-for-profit (NFP) enterprise is that it enjoys an exemption from 
taxation and at the same time operates under a nondistribution constraint—that is, any surplus of 
revenues over expenses cannot be distributed as profits to the firm’s “owners.” Much economic 
activity nowadays occurs in the NFP sector of the economy. Even when the sector is defined nar-
rowly, as we shall do in this paper, as comprising only charitable nongovernmental enterprises 
(thus excluding government corporations such as Amtrak and the Postal Service, public universi-
ties and hospitals, and worker, business, and consumer cooperatives), it is estimated to produce 
one-fifth of all U.S. R&D, much of the economy’s human capital that is not produced by on-the-
job training, many cultural products and services, and much of the nation’s health care, which 
alone accounts for about one-sixth of all U.S. economic activity. About a fifth of all U.S. corpo-
rations are incorporated under NFP statutes. 
A substantial amount of antitrust activity
1 occurs in the NFP sector. Table 1 presents data on 
federal antitrust activity since 1980 in the health care industry, the largest industry in the sector
2. 
Table 1: Antitrust Cases Brought by the U.S. Department of Justice or Federal Trade 
Commission in the Health Care Sector since 1980 
Industry FP  NFP  Total 
Hospitals  20 17 37 
Pharmaceuticals 25  0  25 
Health  Insurers  3 2 5 
Physicians and physician groups  58  9  67 
HMO’s  2 0 2 Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     3 
Total  108 28  136 
 
If the pharmaceutical industry, which is entirely for-profit, is excluded, almost a third of the 
antitrust cases in the health-care industry involved NFPs. This is due in part to the fact that the 
community hospital industry, the most important industry in the NFP sector, recently experi-
enced a merger wave. There were about a thousand mergers in the industry in the 1990s, an in-
dustry consisting of about five thousand hospitals of which about 60% are not-for profit.
3
Conventional economic analysis of the NFP sector
4 sharply distinguishes between the for-
profit (FP) and NFP forms, which might seem to imply that the behavior of the two sectors is 
sufficiently different to warrant different antitrust treatment. It has been argued that non-profits 
solve an asymmetric information problem between donors (who cannot readily monitor the pro-
vision of the services that they wish to promote) and the providers of those services
5 and have 
different, altruistic objectives from profit-maximizing firms.
6 In either case, the fact that NFP 
firms do not distribute profits for private gain has persuaded some judges and scholars that non-
profit firms may not be as interested in exploiting market power as for-profit firms are assumed 
to be.
7 Other judges and scholars have questioned that analysis and concluded that there are no 
significant differences in behavior of for-profit and not-for-profit firms that would justify a dif-
ference in antitrust treatment.
8
Yet there is no general antitrust exemption for NFPs.
9 There are three major categories of 
antitrust activity in the NFP sector. The first involves trade and professional associations and co-
operatives. Although these entities are usually organized in the NFP form, they are agents of FP 
firms and individuals, and the courts sensibly pierce the NFP label and treat them as functionally Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     4 
FP entities.
10 The second class of NFP antitrust cases involves educational institutions charged 
with collusion, for example collusion on financial aid to students or collusion on the grant of 
rights to broadcast intercollegiate sports events.
11 The third major class of NFP antitrust cases 
involves challenges to mergers between NFP hospitals.
12 In the second and third classes, defen-
dants will often argue that their NFP status entitles them either to an outright exemption from 
antitrust scrutiny or to a different, more permissive standard of liability. These arguments fail. 
Should they? The main efficiency rationale for applying antitrust law to for-profit firms—that it 
reduces or eliminates the deadweight loss associated with market power— is equally applicable 
to non-profits. Even if producers care about consumers in addition to profits, with the result that 
the level of activity of the two types of firm differs—in particular, quantity and quality of output 
may be greater for an NFP firm than for an FP firm—the incentive to change that behavior 
through collusion, and the adverse social consequences that result from that change, are similar. 
Altruism may lower prices but raise mark-ups relative to profit maximization because altruistic 
firms benefit from exploiting market power even when this would lead them to price below cost 
without regard to competition. For example, although many NFP universities in the US have tui-
tion revenues below operating costs, thereby indicating below-average-cost pricing, some of 
these universities have been charged with collusive behavior that violates antitrust law. The im-
portant implication is that promoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the particular 
objectives of producers. The fact that antitrust law does not distinguish between the two sectors 
is thus consistent with our analysis. Indeed, we show that consumer-oriented antitrust policy may 
be more important for consumer-oriented than for conventional profit-maximizing firms in en-
hancing economic welfare. Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     5 
In addition to arguing that antitrust matters for the non-profit sector, we arrive at the coun-
terintuitive implication that the effects of antitrust enforcement for this sector depend on the be-
havior of firms in the for-profit sector. Non-profit firms receive free capital in the form of dona-
tions, giving them a cost advantage that makes the marginal firms in their industry the for-profit 
firms, the firms that therefore drive the industry’s response to policy measures, such as antitrust.   
Our analysis relates to several strands of work on the NFP sector. Although there is a sub-
stantial economic literature on NFP firms, most of it is at the firm rather than the market level 
and so does not address issues of competition.
13 There is also an empirical literature on the rela-
tive significance of concentration in raising price in the two sectors, particularly in the hospital 
industry,
14 which to date has had mixed results. 
I: Restraint of Trade by Monopolies That Do Not Maximize Profits 
For a given level of output y, let π(y) ≡p(y)y-c(y) denote profits where p(y) denotes the in-
verse demand function and c(y) the total cost of production. We assume that the firm is donor-
operated in the sense of being operated by someone who has utility over his own consumption, 
m, and output u(m,y).
15 We call this “output preference.” Output preference can arise from an 
altruistic concern with consumers, but need not. For example, professors who prefer research 
output to maximizing their pecuniary income may favor lower-than-maximum tuition in order to 
attract good students, teaching being a complement to research. Donors may give money to hos-
pitals or universities to do research on diseases they have or fear without necessarily being altru-
istic. They seek an in-kind return on their investment, in terms of output, rather than a pecuniary 
return, as a for-profit investor would seek. Even donations that seem “purely” altruistic may be 
motivated also or instead by desire to signal wealth, culture, or generosity. Our analysis, how-Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     6 
ever, applies regardless of the precise motivation for participating in or contributing to not-for-
profit activities.  
The producer chooses output subject to the constraint that his consumption and costs cannot 
exceed unearned income, mo, and revenues earned on productive output 
(1)  m + c(y)= mo + p(y)y. 
The output choice thereby induces a utility function over output alone   
(2)  v(y)=u(mo + π(y),y). 
Donors forgo their own consumption to fund the activities of non-profit-firms; whatever costs 
are not picked up by sales are funded by donations. Donations are equivalent to negative profits. 
However, as donors do not give up all of their own consumption, there is always a tradeoff be-
tween profits and output.  
The producer chooses the quantity to produce that will maximize his utility: 
(3)  dv/dy = uc πy + uy = 0 ⇔  -uy /uc = πy . 
The feasible range for the consumption-output tradeoff is determined by the downward-
sloping part of the profit-function. An output-preferring firm will always operate in that region 
and thus outproduce a profit-maximizing firm because if he did not, he would be better off ex-
panding both consumption and output.  Therefore, output is depicted only for levels, above the 
one that maximizes profits, π*=π(y*), at which consumption is maximized. Unlike profit maximi-
zation, where only the budget set is affected by choice of output, the optimal choice for the NFP 
equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and output to the corresponding 
tradeoff in the market, as represented by the declining part of the profit-function. Donations, i.e., Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     7 
negative profits, are elicited if the output preference is strong enough to bring revenues below the 
cost of production.
16
  Rewriting the optimality condition, one obtains a generalized  mark-up condition 
(4)  p(1-|ε|)= cy - uy/uc 
where ε≡pyy/p is the elasticity of the inverse demand function.  This is the standard mark-up 
condition adjusted by the marginal rate of substitution, uy/uπ, between profits and output and may 
be reinterpreted as a reduction in the cost of production. The optimal price falls, and thus the op-
timal quantity rises, with the willingness of the monopolist to trade profits for output. However, 
although price will be lower, markups above competitive prices may be higher.
17 Indeed, optimal 
price may involve a mark-down below, as opposed to a mark-up above, costs but at the same 
time be reduced by competition more than in the case of profit maximization. Mark-down below 
cost occurs when donations finance production to the extent that revenue through sales need not 
cover marginal or average costs.   
  An illustrative special case is where the producer’s preferences are quasi-linear and the pro-
ducer cares about consumers in terms of their surplus  
(5)  u(m,y)=m +  z(s(y)) 
(6)  s(y) ≡ ∫ 0≤q≤y [p(q)-p(y)] dq 
Substituting in uy=zsp|ε|, the mark-up condition has the compact form 
(7)  p[1-|ε|(1- zs)]= cy 
In this case, the marginal rate of substitution between consumer surplus and profits discounts the 
negative effect of the demand elasticity on price. This occurs because the gain in surplus from 
expanding output by reducing price to infra-marginal consumers, sy=-pyy=p|ε|, confers benefits Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     8 
on a producer who cares about consumers. When the producer does not care about consumers, 
i.e., when he maximizes profits as when uy=zs=0, the mark-up condition reduces to the conven-
tional one. 
A.  Socially Optimal Pricing  
  The classic efficiency rationale for antitrust policy under profit maximization is that antitrust 
eliminates the deadweight loss associated with monopoly power. There are two components to 
this argument. The first is that socially optimal pricing differs from optimal monopoly pricing: 
marginal cost pricing is different from the optimal mark-up of price implied by monopoly power. 
Second, competition will lead to the socially optimal price: competition implies marginal cost 
pricing.  This subsection establishes the first result for the case in which the firm does not maxi-
mize profits. The subsequent section establishes the second result for such a firm. 
  The output that maximizes social welfare w(y) is comprised of the sum of producer and con-
sumer welfare, w(y)≡v(y)+s(y), satisfies the necessary first-order condition  
(8)  dw/dy=dv/dy + ds/dy = 0 
This simple first-order condition illustrates the basic misalignment between producer-surplus and 
social-surplus maximization that exists even when firms do not maximize profits. Let yv and yw 
denote the output levels that maximize firm utility v and social welfare w respectively. As the 
consumer surplus rises with output everywhere, ds/dy > 0, the first-order condition for the so-
cially optimal level of output implies that the producer must lose on the margin by expanding 
output farther; dv/dy(yw) < 0, which is in conflict with the first-order condition defining the opti-
mal output from the firm’s own perspective; dv/dy(yv) = 0. Whether producers prefer output to Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     9 
profits or the reverse, the socially optimal level of output will be larger as the firm takes into ac-
count consumer surplus, which rises with output.
18
   
This general misalignment between producer welfare and social welfare implies that mar-
ginal cost pricing is not the norm by which social efficiency should be evaluated, as it is in the 
case of profit maximization. We derive the socially optimal price by noting that the social wel-
fare function w for a monopolist with preferences u can be reinterpreted as the objective function 
of a monopolist with preferences w=u + s. The socially optimal price that satisfies the reinter-
preted monopoly condition is 
(9)  p[1-|ε|]= cy -wy/wc = cy -[uy +sy ]/uc. 
Since sy=p|ε|, we can rewrite this condition as 
(10)  p[1-|ε|(1- 1/uc)]= cy -uy/uc. 
The socially optimal price discounts the optimal price for the monopolist even though the mo-
nopolist may well care about consumers. This means that the socially optimal price will often be 
below cost. 
  Consider by way of illustration the case in which the monopolist cares about consumer sur-
plus as much as does about profits: 
(11)  u=π+s 
In that case the monopoly price will equal marginal cost, the benchmark competitive price for 
efficient for-profit production. But the socially optimal price will involve a discount below cost  
(12)  p(yv)= cy 
(13)  p(yw)= cy/(1+ |ε|) Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     10 
Thus, even though a supplier may be altruistic, he may not be altruistic enough, when acting 
only to satisfy his own desires, to set the socially optimal price. The efficient output requires that 
price be set below marginal cost because the producer desires to reduce his own consumption in 
order to finance additional output. This implies the counterintuitive but fundamental proposition 
that an efficient antitrust policy in the NFP sector should not seek merely to equate price to mar-
ginal cost, because output may be restricted (from a social standpoint) even at that level; the goal 
of antitrust in such a case is to force price below marginal cost.
19
B.  Competition and Socially Optimal Pricing 
To study the impact of competition on socially optimal pricing, we consider a homogeneous 
model of Cournot competition with an inverse demand curve p(Y) for the total quantity of 
i=1,2,..n firms; Y=Σ yi.  Under the output levels represented by the vector y≡(y1, ..,yn ) the n pro-
ducers are assumed to have utility functions (v1(y), ..,vn(y)) over profits and output, as in 
(14)  vi(y)=u(πi (y),yi) 
where  πi(y)≡p(Y)yi–c(yi) are the profits of the i
th firm under a given vector of output. It is 
straightforward to show that the necessary first-order condition is    
(15)  p(1- mi |ε|)=cy-uy/uπ ,   i=1,2,..,n 
where mi≡yi/Y is the market share of the i
th firm. As was true for the monopoly case, the first-
order condition is simply a reinterpretation of the condition under profit maximization, with the 
costs of production lowered because of output preference.  
  If increased competition is defined as an increase in the number of producers, n, the socially 
optimal price converges to the efficient price as n goes to infinity by making the market share, m, 
of each firm go to zero. This is the generalized result of the case of profit maximization, where Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     11 
perfect competition leads to socially optimal marginal-cost pricing.  The key point is that al-
though the levels of output may be more desirable from a consumer perspective under altruism, 
induced by the effect of uy/uπ, the change in the behavior induced by market power, caused by 
the effect of m, is similar across producer objectives. Competition, the subject of antitrust policy, 
is valuable to consumers in both cases even though they may prefer an altruistic producer to a 
selfish one. 
This analysis implies a general efficiency rationale for promoting competition regardless of 
producer preferences. Competition, whether with profit maximizers or just with other NFP firms, 
might drive the price of the altruistic firm’s output to a level so far below cost that the personal 
utility loss of the donors exceeded their utility gain from the benefit of the low price to the firm’s 
customers. If that were the case, the firm would have an incentive to collude with its competitors 
to raise price, albeit not all the way to its costs.  
C.  The Value of Collusion by Altruistic Producers 
When we consider an oligopoly industry, we discover some important differences from the 
monopoly case. Generally, altruistic producers will gain from coordinating their activities be-
cause the behavior of each firm affects the overall utility, as opposed to simply profits, of other 
firms. It may be that collusion expands output and raises welfare, rather than restricts output and 
lowers welfare, among altruistic producers.    
Under the output levels y≡(y1, ..,yn) among n producers with utility functions (v1(y), ..,vn(y)), 
their joint utility is 
(16)  V(y)≡Σ vi(y)=Σ ui(πi (y),y) Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     12 
Note that the utility of each firm is assumed to depend on the entire output vector, including the 
outputs of other firms, as would be the case, for example, if some producers cared about aggre-
gate output or consumer surplus. The output levels that are optimal with respect to the industry 
satisfy the necessary first-order conditions 
(17)  dV/dyj=Σ dvi(y)/dyj = [(duj/dπ)(dπj/dyj)+ duj/dyj ] +  
                                                       Σi≠j[(dui/dπ)(dπi/dyj)+ dui/dyj ] = 0 
The first bracketed term is the marginal conditions for the j
th firm when expanding its output. 
The second term consists of the external effects on other firms from that output expansion. This 
second external effect has two offsetting parts: the negative impact on profits induced by a lower 
price and the positive impact that extra output has on other firms that value output. Whether the 
net externality is negative or positive determines whether collusion produces less or more output 
than the private equilibrium. The more altruistic firms are, as measured by the marginal rate of 
substitution between output and profits, the more likely it is that the positive external effect will 
dominate.   
  To illustrate, consider a homogeneous constant-returns industry with a constant elasticity of 
demand in which aggregate output is valued according to   
(18)  ui=πi + αY. 
In this case the relative size of the socially optimal output from the industry’s perspective, Ys, 
differs from the output of a private (Nash) equilibrium, Yp, satisfies  
(19)  ln Ys/Yp=-(1/|ε|)[ (c-α)(1-|ε|/n)/(c-nα)(1-|ε|)] Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     13 
It follows that the ratio rises in altruism α. In particular, the social optimum goes from being be-
low the private optimum at low levels of altruism, Ys/Yp < 1 for low α, to being above it for high 
levels of altruism. 
  So in industries in which it is clear that the value of output expansion is more important than 
the cost of price reductions, such as industries in which output is sold at zero price, there is social 
value in collusion to reduce free-riding. For example, welfare organizations should be allowed to 
divide markets geographically in order to serve the largest possible poor population. But when 
the NFP firm cares only about firm-level, rather than industry-level, output, collusion will restrict 
output and should be forbidden. This situation is evidenced by firm-specific, as distinct from in-
dustry-wide, donations, such as alumni donations to universities or patient donations to hospitals. 
In contrast, when donations are industry-wide, as in donations to organizations like United Way 
or the Red Cross, collusion may expand output. 
Regardless of whether a firm has an incentive to collude with its competitors in restricting or 
expanding output, it will often have an incentive to collude with its competitors to lower the 
price of its inputs through the exercise of monopsony power. Utility-maximizing firms always 
prefer lower costs.  Indeed, the most common type of collusion in the NFP sector, is probably 
monopsonistic, as in avoiding competition to “buy” minority students or student athletes. Until 
challenged by an antitrust suit, the Ivy League colleges colluded to deny scholarships based on 
merit rather than need in order to increase scholarships for minority students without a net in-
crease in scholarship expense.
20 The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a consor-
tium of nonprofit colleges and universities, appears to operate much like a conventional cartel Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     14 
designed in this case to reduce the cost of student athletes.
21 The welfare effects are presumably 
the same as with other monopsonies. 
D.  The Welfare Loss of Altruistic Restraint of Trade 
Although we have argued that the standard rationale for antitrust—the avoidance of dead-
weight loss—generalizes to NFPs, one may suspect that the deadweight loss created by them 
would be small compared to that created by firms interested only in higher profits. After all, if a 
producer cares about consumers, the loss he imposes on them should be smaller than if he does 
not care. However, our analysis produces the counterintuitive result that often monopolization is 
more harmful when done by altruistic producers than when done by profit-maximizing firms. 
Consider an altruistic producer with preferences u(mo+π(y),y; α) parameterized by the degree 
of output-preference α. If we denote the monopolistic and competitive outputs by yM(α) and 
yC(α) respectively, then the welfare loss, L(α),  is 
(20)  L(α)≡ ∫ yM(α)≤q≤ yC(α) [p(q)-p(yC(α))] dq. 
Altruism has two effects on the welfare loss brought about by monopolization. The first is 
through the reduction in output brought about by monopolization, the second through its effect 
on the average surplus lost as a result of that reduction. Altruism will often entail larger losses of 
output, and these losses will occur further down the inverse demand curve, because the altruist’s 
output is often larger than a profit-maximizing firm’s output. Therefore, unless the inverse de-
mand curve is highly convex, so that the average surplus lost is larger when lost at low levels of 
output, altruism will increase the welfare loss from monopolization. Even though the effects of 
altruism on output are positive, market power may be more damaging under altruism.   Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     15 
To illustrate, consider the case in which demand curves are linear, p(y) = a - by, and the al-
truist has the quasi-linear preferences u(π,y;α)=π+αy. In this case, the monopoly output will be 
half the competitive output and the monopoly price halfway up the demand curve from the com-
petitive price: 
(21)  yC - yM = yM =[a - (c - α)]/2b 
(22)  pM – pC = [a - (c - α)]/2. 
These price and quantity effects imply that the deadweight loss is 
(23)  L(α)= [yC - yM][pM - pC]/2 =(1/4b)[a - (c - α)]
2  
In this case, both the output lost and the average surplus lost by excluded consumers increase 
with altruism, so that altruism has a positive effect on deadweight loss, dL/dα  >0.
22  
  More generally, the positive impact of altruism on the efficiency loss from market power 
comes from the fact that altruistic firms act as if they have lower costs, and the efficiency loss 
caused by market power tends to decrease with costs.  
E. Multiple-Product  Monopoly 
Altruistic firms may use their market power to discriminate in favor of some consumers at 
the expense of others.
23 For example, hospitals or universities may charge poor consumers less at 
the expense of rich ones if expanding the output for poor is part of their mission. With altruistic 
preferences, discrimination may involve using market power in one market to subsidize below-
cost selling in the other.
24  Several aspects of such cross-subsidization are worth noting.  First, it 
may be consistent with perfect competition. Second, it should not be confused with predatory 
pricing.  And third, as is true for the case of profit-maximizing firms, the feasibility of price dis-
crimination depends on the cost of preventing arbitrage. Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     16 
Consider a monopoly producer that has two output levels, yP and yR, but for which the mo-
nopolist only has output preference for the first group (the poor) but not for the second (the rich). 
The monopolist’s preferences are then 
(24)  v(yR, yP) = u(mo+ π(yR, yP), yP) 
where profits are 
(25)  π(yR, yP) = pR(yR)yR + pP(yP)yP - c(yR, yP) 
If costs are separable, so that serving the poor does not affect the cost of serving the rich, profits 
will be maximized in the rich market at a level denoted π*. The market simply acts to expand the 
consumption-output choice on its income-expansion path from [c(mo),yP(mo)] to [c(mo+π*), 
yP(mo+ π*)]. Part of the extra income π* gained from the market power in the rich market will be 
spent on extra consumption and part of it on extra output for the poor. Whether in funding the 
consumption of the donor or the output of the poor, this use of market power entails an ineffi-
cient use of resources. If competing NFPs got together and agreed to charge rich patients uni-
formly high prices for medical care in order to subsidize the provision of medical care to poor 
patients, the NFPs would be taxing the rich—forcing them to finance a portion of the NFPs’ 
charitable activities for the poor. In particular, the amount of donations would be determined by 
the total profits in the rich and poor market. Donations would fall if the profit on the sales to the 
rich rose more than the profit on sales to the poor declined: 
(26)  d[π*  + πP(yP(mo+ π*)) ] / dπ*  = 1 + (dπP/dyP)(dyP/dπ*) 
Thus market power in the rich market could lead the donor to donate less, shifting the bur-
den of subsidizing the poor to the rich consumers, even though they may not care about the poor 
as much as the donor does, in which event there could be a decline in total utility. A further Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     17 
complication, however, concerns competition between such a firm and profit maximizers serving 
both markets. The latter would operate at levels of output that satisfied the standard marginal 
conditions. A firm with output preference for the poor would operate at a higher output level, but 
if its two outputs are complements—that is, if serving the poor lowers the cost of serving the rich 
on a per-person basis (and vice versa)—then the altruistic firm has a competitive advantage over 
a for-profit firm that serves the same two markets. This occurs because its larger output in its 
main activity (for example, serving the poor) lowers its costs in the complementary activity.
25
  Price discrimination as such does not violate antitrust law. In the case just given, where the 
nondistribution constraint prevents the firm from obtaining monopoly profits overall, discrimina-
tion produces a net gain in efficiency. If, however, a firm that has a monopoly in one market uses 
the profits that it obtains there to sell below cost in another market with the aim and probable ef-
fect of driving an equally or more efficient competitor out of that market (or preventing a com-
petitor from entering), it will violate section 2 of the Sherman Act regardless of the monopolist’s 
NFP status. If an NFP sells below cost merely because it derives utility from the additional out-
put that such pricing enables, it is not really selling below cost and there is no antitrust violation. 
If however it sells below cost with the additional objective of driving out an equally or more ef-
ficient competitor (or competitors) so that it can charge a higher price, albeit still a price below 
cost, then it would be in antitrust jeopardy. 
II: Competition and Antitrust in Mixed Industries 
  In this section, continuing the discussion begun at the end of the preceding section, we con-
sider “mixed” industries, that is, industries that consist of both NFP and FP firms, as in the hospi-
tal industry and to a lesser extent the education industry. The previous analysis showed that the Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     18 
standard rationale for antitrust was as applicable to altruistic firms as it was to profit-maximizing 
firms. In this section we arrive at the surprising implication that the effects of enforcing anti-trust 
in the non-profit sector often depend on the supply behavior of the for-profit sector. 
If NFP firms have lower costs because of their free capital (and perhaps free labor) and this 
leads them to price their output below marginal cost, then the only reason for the existence of FP 
firms in the same industry would be a scarcity of altruists—that is, insufficient labor or capital 
contributed by charitable donors to provide productive capacity sufficient to supply the entire 
market at a price equal to marginal cost. On this view, the FP firms in a mixed industry corre-
spond to the fringe firms in a dominant-firm industry (George J. Stigler 1968), that is, an indus-
try in which one firm has a stable dominant market share because its average cost curve is below 
that of the other firms throughout most but not all of the range of feasible output. The market 
price will be equal to the marginal cost of the fringe firms, which here would correspond to firms 
in the for-profit sector. 
  It might seem to follow that, provided the antitrust laws are enforced against FP firms, com-
pressing their price to marginal cost, there is no need to enforce the antitrust laws against NFP 
firms in mixed industries. But this is incorrect. The NFP firms may collude to reduce their out-
put. The resulting increase in price will induce an expansion of output by the fringe of FP firms. 
Assuming that firms in the fringe have rising average costs and that the expansion of the fringe’s 
output takes the form of the existing firms’ increasing their output rather than new firms’ enter-
ing whose average costs are identical to the average costs of the existing firms, the result will be 
an increase in the industry’s marginal cost, and so the output of the industry will be lower than 
before. (This is just an application of Stigler’s theory of how a dominant firm, provided it has a Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     19 
cost advantage, can obtain monopoly profits notwithstanding the existence of a competitive 
fringe in its market.) 
  This analysis is similar to the issues addressed by the Landes-Posner market-power model.
26 
The higher the elasticity of supply of the fringe firms, the higher the elasticity of demand of the 
firm whose market power we’re interested in measuring. And likewise the lower the market 
share of that firm, the higher the elasticity of demand facing it. Of course, if the elasticity of sup-
ply of the fringe firms is infinite, the nonfringe firms have no market power regardless of their 
market share, provided the market share of the nonfringe firms exceeds zero percent, however 
slightly. And if the elasticity of supply of the fringe firms is zero because the optimal price 
charged by the nonfringe firms is below the cost of the fringe firms throughout the entire feasible 
range of output, then the fringe firms have no effect on the elasticity of demand of nonfringe 
firms. The realistic case, however, has fringe firms with nonzero elasticity of supply and an ag-
gregate market share significantly greater than zero. 
  Consider now a market in which the nonfringe firms are two NFPs each with 40 percent of 
the market, and there is a fringe of FPs that supply the other 20 percent of the market demand. 
Even though there is a competitive fringe that can expand its output if the nonfringe firms raise 
their price (for we’re assuming a positive elasticity of supply), a merger of or collusion between 
the two NFPs would result in a higher price (assuming that costs remain unchanged) because 
their joint market share would now be greater than it was before the merger of collusion. For ex-
ample, suppose the market elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply of the fringe firms 
are both 1; then before the merger or collusion the elasticity of demand facing each of the NFP Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     20 
firms would have been 4; afterwards it is only 1.5, implying a substantial increase in market 
power. 
This analysis shows that antitrust cannot ignore NFP firms in mixed markets merely because 
they have lower costs than FP firms so that the market price is determined by the costs of the FP 
firms. But in addition it is not certain that NFP firms will, merely because of their output prefer-
ence, be the low-cost producers. The nondistribution constraint may limit NFPs’ access to capital 
and ability to incentivize their employees, and these disadvantages may outweigh the lower costs 
that are due to altruism (and resulting output preference) and to tax-exempt status. 
A.  The Competitive Disadvantage of Profit-Maximizing Firms 
Consider to begin with competition between altruists and profit maximizers without worry-
ing about the legal regulations that by defining constrain the nonprofit sector. In the long run, 
given free entry and exit in a competitive market, the breakeven combinations of output and 
price (y,p) at which a producer is indifferent between entry and exit are defined by  
(27)  v(y,py-c(y))=v(0,0). 
Under profit maximization, these combinations reduce to the familiar average cost curve 
p=c(y)/y, which is assumed to have the standard U-shape. If a firm values output in itself, profits 
along the breakeven curve are always negative, implying that donations are made. Specifically, 
vy > 0 and v(y,π) = v(0,0) implies π < 0. Such a firm has average monetary costs above price. As 
a result, the firm’s sales do not cover costs, and donations make up the shortfall. If there were an 
infinite number of potential suppliers of each type v, then in the long run, price would move to its 
lowest point along the breakeven curve of all types. This simply corresponds to the lowest-cost Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     21 
suppliers surviving in the for profit case. In the case of two firm types, the lowest sustainable 
price is pl for the profit-maximizing firms and p0 < p1 for the profit-deviating firms. 
The above analysis implies the surprising result that profit maximizers can never survive 
against competition from an infinite supply of profit-deviating firms. This competitive advantage 
of profit deviators is most easily understood by realizing that the cost of capital is lower for 
profit-deviating firms; donations represent capital obtained at zero cost, because they require no 
interest payments and the firm may simply keep the principal. The fact that nonprofit firms spend 
money soliciting and competing for the capital of donors provides evidence that donors, and thus 
profit-deviating firms, must be in finite supply. We will assume this form of scarce altruism by 
taking as given that there are A potential profit-deviating firms. Because we do not take a stand 
on what determines the number or market share of the A firms, we will provide predictions based 
not on the level of nonprofit activity but instead on the changes in nonprofit activity induced by 
variations in market incentives. This resembles the approach of neoclassical theory, which avoids 
explaining the level of production and focuses on the changes in production induced by varying 
market conditions. 
If profit maximizers coexist with A profit-deviating firms, profit-maximizers will be the 
marginal firms, whose behavior governs marginal changes in industry price and quantity. This 
implies that in a mixed industry with competition, the long-run behavior of industry output and 
price when the for-profit sector is perfectly elastic are unaffected by the presence of profit-
deviators. To see this more precisely, consider a case in which preferences are indexed by a pa-
rameter α in [0,1]. A firm α has the utility function v(y,π|α), with α = 0 for profit-maximizers, 
and vy(y,π|α$) increasing in α.
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G(α), where G has support α in $(0,1]. These firms act as if they were profit-maximizers with 
the cost functions C(y|α)
28, where marginal and average cost fall in α. Intuitively, since such 
firms value output intrinsically, their overall (pecuniary plus non-pecuniary) costs are lower. 
Profit-maximizing firms, those with the highest average and marginal cost, can survive only if 
the long-run price is at or above their minimum average cost, denoted by m = minyc(y)/y. In 
other words, they can survive only if the output supplied by profit-deviators cannot satisfy de-
mand at a price lower than m. More precisely, given a demand function D(p), profit-maximizers 
can exist only if  
(28)   p ≤ m,     ∫ > ), ( ) | ( ) ( α α dG p y A p D
 where y(p|α) is the supply function of type α. For the marginal firm α whose rents, but not nec-
essarily profits, are zero, reinterpreted average cost equal price:  
(29)  .
) | (
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Only firms with enough altruism produce; that is, only firms with α ≥ α are in the market. If de-
mand is not met by supply at a price below minimum average cost m, the price rises to m, and 
profit-maximizers enter until excess demand is eliminated. Therefore, in the long run, when the 
supply of profit-maximizing firms is perfectly elastic, the market behaves as if there were only 
profit maximizers; long-run price gets driven down to minimum average cost, and long-run 
quantity is given by the market demand at this price. The long-run equilibrium is: 
(30)  p = m, 
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Thus altruism confers a competitive advantage on profit-deviators. This conclusion differs from 
the common belief that when profit maximizers are driven to please their customers, they disci-
pline the behavior of profit deviators in a competitive market. If profit maximizers price at 
minimum average costs, the argument goes, competitive markets force producers with output 
preferences to follow by eliminating “rents” which they might otherwise spend on output.
29 Our 
analysis implies the opposite: competition allows profit deviators to drive out profit-maximizers 
even if the former have neither market power nor legal advantages. 
B.  The Long-Run Neutrality of Antitrust for the Nonprofit Sector 
The NFP sector is defined by government regulations that distinguish it from the FP sector, 
in particular (a) tax exemptions and (b) the nondistribution constraint.
30 Let d indicate the regula-
tory choice of the firm, where d = 1 when a firm chooses to be for-profit and d = 0 when it de-
cides to be nonprofit. The nonprofit firm is constrained to have economic profits below a certain 
regulated level π ≤ πR, while under for-profit status profits are unconstrained. Monetary cost 
functions differ across status: denoting by c





1(y). Holding output fixed, both total and marginal costs are lower in the 
nonprofit sector. A firm in sector d with preferences v now has the reinterpreted marginal cost 
function Cy
d = cy
d – (vy/vπ), with the supply function y
d(p|v). Since nonprofit firms have to respect 











1). Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     24 
Presented with the option of nonprofit status, the firm chooses between the ability to retain posi-
tive profits and the ability to produce more output given nonprofit tax breaks. 
Every profit-maximizing firm in the industry will choose for-profit status, because it does 
not value the extra output afforded by nonprofit tax breaks. Every profit-deviating firm, on the 
other hand, will choose nonprofit status, because the non-distribution constraint never binds it in 
equilibrium. To understand this result, consider first the case in which the marginal firm is profit 
maximizing. It earns zero profits at the equilibrium price p. Since all profit deviators are more 
altruistic than the profit-maximizing marginal firm, they will choose higher output and lower 
(negative) profits than the marginal firm.
31 Now suppose that the marginal firm is profit deviat-
ing. It must be earning negative profits in order that its rents be driven to zero; all other profit 
deviators are at least as altruistic as the marginal firm and must also be earning negative profits. 
There will then be N
0 = A nonprofit firms, and N
1 for-profit firms covering residual demand at a 
price of minimum average cost 
(34)    ∫ − = ). ( ) | ( ) ( ) 0 | (
0 α α dG m y A m D m y N
l l
The for-profit sector is thus composed of marginal firms (see Darius Lakdawalla and Tomas 
Philipson (1997) for a more comprehensive discussion of this result). As a result, industry behav-
ior mimics that of an entirely for-profit industry, insofar as the long-run price is equal to mini-
mum average cost when supply is perfectly elastic in the long run. We continue to have the neo-
classical results that price reflect costs at the minimum efficient scale and quantity reflects de-
mand at that price; p = m and Y = D(m). Put differently, one may understand the industry’s re-
sponse to an intervention, such as antitrust, without knowing anything about the share of output 
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This has the counterintuitive implication that antitrust policy in the nonprofit sector may not 
affect consumer welfare. This is so when antitrust policy is fully enforced in the for-profit sector. 
In that case the for-profit sector will supply the residual amount of output not supplied in the 
non-profit sector at a price reflecting minimum average costs in the long run. Aggregate output 
will therefore be whatever demand is at that price regardless of what share of that output is pro-
duced by the nonprofit sector. 
This result holds only for mixed industries, however, which in our analysis result from altru-
ism being scarce relative to aggregate demand. If altruism is not scarce, there may only be non-
profits in the industry and then antitrust policy towards such firms may greatly affect consumer 
welfare. 
III:  Antitrust Exemptions and Intellectual Property  
Patent, copyright, and trade secret law allows firms to obtain lawful monopolies of intellec-
tual property and thus raises the question whether this regime is as appropriate for the NFP sector 
as it seems to be for the FP sector. The rationale for the law’s permitting (indeed encouraging) 
these monopolies is that without protection from free riders, the creators of intellectual property 
would have insufficient incentives to invest in its creation, since they could have no confidence 
of being able to recover their fixed costs. The cost of making an additional copy of a piece of in-
tellectual property is generally less than its average total cost and is sometimes quite close to 
zero even for intellectual property that may have cost a great deal to create. As patents are only 
valuable when the market power granted is exploited by the innovator, the issue then becomes 
whether an NFP firm will exploit market power to the degree necessary to generate sufficient 
innovation. Our analysis implies that patents may have larger effects on R&D for altruistic firms Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     26 
even though they may price below costs when the product is marketed and therefore, mistakenly, 
look as if they are not exploiting market power. 
More precisely, consider a firm that undertakes a level of R&D, z, that results in an increas-
ing and concave probability of discovery p(z). Given the generalized optimal utility level v(α) for 
a producer with altruism α, the producer’s expected utility is 
(35)  E[v] = p(z)v(α) – z. 
In the standard case of a profit maximizer (v = π), this reduces to expected profits. The question 
is how the degree of altruism affects the degree to which R&D is encouraged through patents. If 
z(v) denotes the R&D undertaken in case of v being the optimal level of utility when innovation 
is marketed, then z(α)=z(v(α))-z(0) is the impact on R&D of allowing monopoly production. The 
chain rule implies that  
(36)  dz/dα=(dz/dv)(dv/dα) 
However, we know that the optimal R&D is defined by the first-order condition  
(37)  pZv = 1  
Therefore, provided that p is concave so that there are diminishing returns to R&D, expenditures 
on R&D will rise with the value of production: dz/dv >0. In addition, we know that altruistic 
firms are the low-cost firms in a market, so that the value of production will rise with the degree 
of altruism: dv/dα >0. Consequently, patent protection has larger effects on expenditures on 
R&D for altruistic than for nonaltruistic firms even though the former may price below costs and 
therefore mistakenly appear not to be exploiting market power. 
  Since patents are valuable only if they confer market power in the sense of enabling the pat-
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that it expended on the R&D that enabled the patent to be obtained, the fact that NFP firms do 
seek patent protection shows that they are willing to exploit market power. However, market 
power used solely to recover fixed costs, rather than to generate rents, is benign, which is the jus-
tification for the antitrust exemption of the patent monopoly. But in this respect there is no dif-
ference between NFP and FP firms. 
But suppose that the NFP patentees are altruistic in an industry sense, that is, they value in-
dustry output and not merely their own output.
32 Then the NFP firms will not care quite as much 
about obtaining patents because they want to encourage the use of their innovations rather than 
simply wanting to increase their own revenues. But since, as we have emphasized, NFPs are not 
insensitive to costs, and lost revenues are the equivalent of incurred costs, they may still want to 
seek patent protection. 
Lastly, patenting by a NFP firm can simply be viewed as a special case of cross-
subsidization when the firm cares about a consumer group that does not buy the patented product 
and the firm uses the profits obtained from the patent to subsidize that group. In this case, the 
patent monopoly is used as a method of cross-subsidization that has the same negative welfare 
effects as discussed above. 
IV. Conclusion 
Despite the conceptual differences between for-profit and nonprofit firms stressed in conven-
tional economic analyses of the nonprofit sector, U.S. antitrust law generally does not distinguish 
between these two organizational forms. This paper defends that approach by demonstrating that 
the same incentives to restrain trade exist in the nonprofit sector as in the for-profit sector. Altru-
istic firms benefit from exploiting market power, just as non-altruistic ones do, even when the Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     28 
altruistic firms would price below marginal cost without the spur of competition. Therefore, 
promoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the particular objectives of producers, 
and the fact that antitrust law does not distinguish between the two sectors is efficient.  
The paper has ignored several issues that may be fruitfully addressed by future research. 
First, the regulations defining the NFP sector bars such firms from raising capital through equity 
markets, but presumably few shareholders would be interested in firms pricing below cost which 
is the norm in the NFP sector in which donations partly cover production costs. As we have as-
sumed, donors are essentially the shareholders in this respect.  In a profit-maximizing world, 
shareholders all agree that the firm should maximize profits as it raises incomes of all sharehold-
ers.  However, an important issue regarding the unanimity of the goal of the firm arises for altru-
istic firms because it will likely not be agreement among donors as to the right course of action 
of the firm. In addition, the market for corporate control is missing so that some donors cannot 
pay others to have their say in the behavior of the firm. Therefore, NFP firms will be more likely 
to be disciplined by output markets rather than input markets or corporate control in this respect, 
which in turn makes antitrust regulations particularly important. 
Second,  as our analysis captured only certain forms of utility distinct from that of owners of 
profit-maximizing firms, more general forms of utility functions should be considered in future 
work. However, the general misalignment between social and firm objectives that forms the ba-
sis of antitrust policy is likely to be present for many more general formulations. 
Lastly, the paper did not address fully the impact of antitrust policy in oligopoly markets. 
The theory of the industrial organization of NFP industries is relatively poorly developed and as Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     29 
a result the impact of procompetitive policy poorly understood. Much more research in this area 
seems warranted. 
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18 One may first think that whenever producer and consumer welfare coincide, v(y) = s(y), then the private incen-
tives of the firm coincide with social welfare maximization. However, in this case no optima exist as social and pro-
ducer welfare is strictly increasing in output everywhere. 
19 An illustrative special case is where preferences are of the quasi-linear form, as would be the case under a first-
order Taylor approximation of any utility function 
(1)  v(y) = u(π, y) = π + αy 
when the socially optimal markdown below costs is p = cy - α. The altruistic firm will price at 
(2)  [p - (cy - α)]/p = 1/e 
where e = |-ypp/p| is the demand-elasticity. Hence, the altruistic monopolist may be charging below cost but restrain-
ing trade at the same time. 
 
20 See Gustavo E. Bamberger and Dennis W. Carlton (1999). A complicating factor, however, is that if the best stu-
dents are complements to faculty, the loss of those students may be experienced as a cost to the faculty, thus requir-
ing the colleges to raise salaries in order to restore the wage equilibrium. However, this assumes that the bidding 
wars have a significant effect on the assignment of students to colleges, and they may not. The students may end up 
at the same schools, only with higher rents. 
21 See Arthur A. Fleisher et al. (1992); James V. Koch (1973). 
22 A similar argument holds for a constant elasticity  demand  curve with p(y)=y
-1/ε, with ε> 1. In this case, the dead-
weight loss is L(α)= K(ε) (c - α)
1-ε  where K(ε) is a positive constant that depends on the elasticity of demand. Thus, 
this again implies that the deadweight loss rises with altruism.  
23 Such altruistic discrimination does not violate the non-distribution constraint that defines the NFP sector because 
the constraint applies to the organization as a whole rather than to each separate line of business or consumers. 
24 For empirical support of this theory, see Jonathan Gruber (1994). 
25 This relation has implications for the regulatory treatment of “unrelated business income.” If the alleged “unre-
lated business” is a complement to the NFP’s main, altruistic mission, then it isn’t really unrelated—it promotes the 
fulfillment of the mission. But this is a topic outside the scope of the present paper. Antitrust in Nonprofit Sector                                                     37 
                                                                                                                                                          
26 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981). 
27 For example, we could have v(y,π(y)) = αy + (1-α)π(y). 
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This implies, as assumed throughout, that Cy(y|α) falls in α. 
29 See, for example, Estelle James and Susan Rose-Ackerman (1986). 
30 The nondistribution constraint has certain market consequences that we do not discuss in this paper. In particular, 
the NFP sector cannot raise capital in the equity markets because it cannot offer a profit incentive to investors. As a 
result, there is no market for corporate control of NFP institutions, and so there can be no hostile takeovers of such 
institutions, as there can be in the FP sector, by means of tender offers, although of course friendly takeovers remain 
possible. Despite the differences between the two sectors in terms of corporate control, both forms of organizations 
co-exist under competitive conditions in many industries, which may suggest that output competition is a more im-
portant mechanism for disciplining a firm than competition in the market for corporate control. 
31 To see that profits fall in altruism, observe that a firm with utility v(y,π(y)) will respect the first order condition 
vy/vπ = cy - p. Since vy/vπ is a measure of altruism, the more altruistic firms will choose a higher cost-price differen-
tial. In other words, more altruism leads to higher output and lower profits. 
32 A related issue is whether government-funded R&D should be patentable. It is related because government funded 
R&D operates to replace voluntary donors with involuntary taxpayers who are unlikely to have a preference for the 
output of any particular firm. 